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ABSTRACT 
 
The aim of this paper is to emphasize how the correlations between fiscal policy and 
economic growth are manifesting in the U.E. case. After theoretical framework, the paper 
is organized as follows: Section 2 tries to provide a model at micro economic level for the 
interconnections between fiscal policy and economic growth and Section 3 looks for same 
empirical evidences for the EU 25 case. Finally, some conclusions are drawn and some 
limits of the proposed analysis are derived in Section 4. 
 
 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
The macroeconomic relationship between fiscal policy and economic growth has long 
fascinated economists. Unfortunately, analyses of that relationship have frustrated 
empiricists for almost as long. One root of that frustration is the array of possible policy 
indicators. As Tanzi and Zee (1997) discuss, there are three candidate indicators of fiscal 
policy – government expenditures, taxes and deficits.   
The literature does not systematically favor one indicator of fiscal policy over the others. 
Neoclassical growth models imply that government policy can affect only the output level 
but not the growth rate (Judd, 1985). However, endogenous growth models incorporate 
channels through which fiscal policy can affect long-run growth (Barro 1990, Barro-Sala-
i-Martin 1992, 1995). The latter models classify generally the fiscal policy instruments 
into: a) distortionary taxation, which weakens the incentives to invest in physical/human 
capital, hence reducing growth; b) non-distortionary taxation which does not affect the 
above incentives, therefore growth, due to the nature of the utility function assumed for 
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the private agents; c) productive expenditures that influence the marginal product of 
private capital, henceforth boost growth; d) unproductive expenditures that do not affect 
the private marginal product of capital, consequently growth.  
Unfortunately many empirical studies examining fiscal effects on growth have been based 
only loosely on theoretical models, often testing ad hoc hypotheses relating to government 
size such as government consumption spending or public investments or some aggregate 
measure of tax burden. Not surprisingly, early results were ambiguous or contradictory 
and frequently non-robust (see Agell et al., 1997, for a review).  
Furthermore, Levine and Renelt (1992) investigated the robustness of explanatory 
variables in cross-country regressions using extreme bounds analysis and found that none 
of the fiscal indicators is robustly correlated with economic growth when evaluated 
individually. Nevertheless, the methodology used by Levine and Renelt was challenged to 
be “too strong” by Sala-i-Martin (1997), which investigated the distribution of coefficient 
estimates, concluding that for a substantial number of variables, including the fiscal ones, 
the relation to economic growth is robust. So, the empirical literature on the growth 
effects of fiscal policy produced mixed and non-conclusive results. Kneller et al. (1999) 
argue that one reason for such apparently contradictory results is their failure to 
incorporate the government budget constraint formally into testing procedures. Empirical 
models which do control for the government budget have generally found more robust 
associations between fiscal policy and economic growth (Devarajan et al., 1996; 
Kocherlakota, Yi, 1997, Miller Russek, 1997, de la Fuente, 1997, Kneller et al., 1999). 
Still we will not employ the budget deficit as a descriptor variable for the fiscal policy but 
instead the fiscal pressure and its components. 
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 tries to provide a model at micro economic 
level for the interconnections between fiscal policy and economic growth. Section 3 looks 
for same empirical evidences for the EU 25 case. Finally, some conclusions are drawn and 
some limits of the proposed analysis are derived in Section 4. 
 
 
2. THE CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK 
The effects of the fiscal policy could be localized both at the macro and at the micro 
levels. At the macro level, these are localized in the social redistribution of the resources, 
social output dynamic, “full” or partial labor utilization, emigrational stance and external 
equilibrium. At the micro level, such effects are reflected in the incomes and expenditures 
flux and in the patrimonial architecture. 
A fruitful model for the spillovers of the fiscal policy at the micro level could be 
represented by the framework of the multi-periodic optimization of the patrimonial 
structures model. More exactly, suppose that the economic system is form by N  groups 
of identical agents, each group with its individual utility function. Each of them are 
chosen a certain structure of their wealth by incorporation both M  monetary and Q  non 
monetary assets trying to balance their return to risk ratio and to preserve an “optimal” 
structure of the wealth for a certain number of successive period in order to minimize the 
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adjustments costs for suboptimal structures by taking into account the budgetary 
restriction. So that, the current and expected values for the non monetary assets costs, 
returns and risks as well as the incomes from labor and capital are involved in the 
optimization process. If the information is “imperfect” (is incomplete, unequal distributed 
and there are costs of obtaining, updating and using it) a bounded rationality anticipation 
mechanism will be involved (the anticipation will be form based on a mix mechanism 
which will incorporate “all” the available information from the current and past periods).  
The differences between different agents are reflected by their individual utility functions 
where the return to risk ratio is particularly weighted to reflects the “risk aversion”. 
The formal description of the optimization problem at a global level looks by the 
aggregation of S individual problems like: 
( ) ( )
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where x  is the weight of a non monetary asset i  in the structure of the wealth in the 
current period t , N  is the total of the non monetary assets from the selection universe, 
c  are the costs associated with the buy and hold non monetary assets, L  are the 
monetary and quasy  monetary assets with a high degree of liquidity, Y are the incomes 
from label and capital which are obtaining in the current period and / or are tesaurised 
from previous periods, η are the returns of non monetary components of the wealth 
composed by the monetary flows generated by their utilization and by their prices 
variations , R  are their associated risks and * denotes the anticipated values of the 
involved variables formed in the current period for l  futures periods. 
Relation (1) is a logical restriction: the weights of a particular the non monetary asset 
could be only positive or null and their sum could not exceed “1”. 
Relation (2) is a budgetary restriction: the total amount of the expenditures with buying, 
holding and using the non monetary assets as well as financial resources thesaurised for 
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the futures periods could not exceeds the total of available incomes from work and capital 
obtained in current period or accumulated from past ones. 
Relation (3) is the objective function: each group of agents is trying to maximize not only 
the individual level of return or risk but their ratio. 
Relation (4) is the anticipation mechanism: in a situation of bounded rationality the 
anticipation are formed by taking into account the past and current information as this 
could be obtain. 
This description of the optimization problem implies that: 
• Each group of agent is looking to systematically preserve an “optimal” patrimonial 
structure.  If in the current period this structure becomes as a result of a modification in 
the involved variables “sub-optimal” they are trying to “rewrite” the problem by 
excluding some assets from their wealth and including others. 
• In order to minimize the transactional costs a certain adopted structure should be 
kept at least for some future period so that it is necessary to include the anticipated values 
of the variables. 
• The “optimal” level of monetary balances (the stocks of different medium of 
exchange and medium of payment) is obtained simultaneous with the level of the non 
monetary assets by “solving” the optimization problem so that there is no “residual” 
thesaurisation for prudential or speculative reasons. 
• The objective function implies a “balance” in return to risk ratio elements so that the 
agents could be described as “risk neutral” (with different degree of risk tolerance). In 
others words, they accept to assume a higher degree of risk that the “perfect risk aversion” 
agents and a lower level of return that the “perfect risk takers” in order to obtain a better 
correlation between these variables. Since such an assumption could be critical for the 
optimization problem description it should be noticed that this is not only a simple 
“average agent” description but even more a “autonomous” hypothesis about the social 
mechanisms of risks acceptance: at the “aggregate” level there are nether “casino” 
economical systems nether “old granny” ones. 
• The bounded rationality model implies that all the information which could be 
obtained at an “efficient level of implied costs” is used both from previous as well as from 
current periods. The goal is to adopt the “second best” decisions with “incomplete 
information”. 
A particular issue concerns the definition of the “risk” concept. The key distinction 
involved in defining and obtaining a risk measurement is the one between “risk” and 
“uncertainty”. “Risk” is the probability to obtain an unfavorable result of an 
economic decision. “Unfavorable” means that the result is “positive” but lower that 
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the expected one or the result is “negative”. So that the risk concept incorporates both 
the situations of “unrealized” results and the situation of “looses”.  
“Uncertainty” means that the observable result deviates (in a “positive” or 
“negative” sense) from the expected one. “Uncertainty” reflects both the situations of 
“unfavorable” results as well as the situations of an “excess of the results”. Suppose for 
instance that the returns of a project are “normally” distributed around a certain 
“objective” or “subjective” target value as in Figure 1.In such a case, three main areas 
could be delimited: Area 1 where the returns are positive but lower that the target value 
which could be settled based on the average of the previous values, the average of the 
sectors returns, the “concurrencies average”, the interest or inflation rate, the rate of 
growth for the financial markets etc. or could be a pure subjective value; Area 2 where the 
returns are negative and respectively Area 3 where the returns are positive and higher that 
the target value. Area 1 and Area 2 are forming together the risk zone while all three 
areas are reflecting the uncertainty zone. Of course, the relative importance of the Area 1 
and Area 2 for the risk definition is not the same: the agent will perceive a greater level of 
risk associated will looses that with values of return which are lower that the target but 
still positive. 
 
Figure 1: “Uncertainty” and “risk”: deviations from the expected return 
A methodology to implement at the operational level such risk definition could consist in 
the next steps: 
1. The construction of on risk values set jtr according to the next rules: 
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2. The construction of a global measurement of risk as the Euclidian norm of the risk 
values set components: 
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The m parameters could be seen as measures of risk aversion specific to each group j 1. 
With these features, the optimization problem becomes: 
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This general framework could be applied to study the impact of the fiscal policy changes 
on all the relevant variables. It could be noticed that: 
                                                                    
1
 It should be noticed that the parameter 3m is not necessary equal with “0” since an agent 
could have some interest in any kind of deviation from the target value of return (could be 
interested both in risk and in uncertainty). 
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• The fiscal prelevations are susceptible to influence the costs of buying non monetary 
assets especially if they take the form of indirect taxation; 
• The fiscal prelevations could influence the level and the dynamic of the available 
incomes, the thesaurisation and the returns / risks ratio especially if they reflects direct 
taxation; 
• Same effects are exercised by the public expenditures at the different levels of the 
public authorities’ structures. 
• Apart from positive growth effects of a fiscal expansion, in the last two decades, there 
was an increasing interest in the effects of a fiscal consolidation, which could have in 
certain circumstances a positive effect on growth. For instance, analyzing the cases of 
Denmark and Ireland, Giavazzi and Pagano (1990) were the first to prove the 
expansionary effects of reduction in the size of budget deficit or a fiscal contraction, via 
the interest rate premium and government credibility. This last element is also susceptible 
to influence the expectation mechanism as well as the risk aversion ( if the capacity of the 
fiscal policy to stabilize the social output dynamic is perceived to increase then it is 
possible to observe a shift in the empirical levels of the m parameters. 
The effects of the fiscal policy characteristics could formally describe as: 
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where supplementary from the previous notations: D  is a parameter of the “direct” fiscal 
prelevation (such as the “fiscal pressure” computed based on this kind of taxation), I  
describes the “indirect” taxation , A  is linked with the social redistribution of incomes, 
PE  are the public expenditures while BD  is the budgetary deficit. According with the 
relations (1), (2.1.), (3.2.), (4.1.): 
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:0C The fiscal policy could affect the flows of incomes and expenditures, the global level 
of social output as well as the “monetary balances” via the changes in the “budgetary 
restriction” of the wealth structure optimization induced by its different components.  
:1C The fiscal policy could affect the anticipation mechanisms as well as the risk 
aversion both via the changes in the objective function and in the relative importance of 
the past and current information which is changing as the public authorities’ credibility 
vary over time (the agents’ trust in their capacity to stabilize the dynamic of the social 
output and to reduce as a consequence the afferent volatility of the economic 
performances). 
Of course, the viability of the 10 CC −  findings depends on a set of several conditions 
which are far to be trivial ones. Among these, one could notice: 
• The global viability of the optimization problem framework with its central question: 
does the agents systematically optimizing?  Or in a more radical formulation: do they 
even taking into account the “optimal” structure of their wealth? 
• The “exact” nature of the anticipation mechanisms: if the bounded rationality model 
does not stand at least the 1C viability is implicitly invalided, 
• The taxonomy of the selection universe for the non monetary assets and the liquidity 
degree for different “monetary” and “quasi monetary” assets could be directly reflected in 
the returns and risks. Or, such aspects are directly linked with the structural and 
institutional characteristics of the economic systems which modulates the amplitude and 
the configuration of the connections between the fiscal policy and return to risk ratio. 
Even more, the different determinants of returns and risks (prices of monetary and non 
monetary assets, interest and exchanges rates) are susceptible to be influenced in non-
uniforms ways by the fiscal policy that could not be predicted on ex-ante basis. 
Since all these aspects and many others non specified here could leads to various 
empirical situations the 10 CC −  set could be only interpreted in a “weak” sense according 
to which the fiscal policy matters for expenditures, incomes, “monetary balances”, 
returns, risks and anticipation mechanism but the “exact” degree of such a influence 
depends on particular values of the involved parameters. 
 
3. THE FISCAL POLICY AND THE SOCIAL OUTPUT: AN EMPIRICAL TEST 
FOR THE EU COUNTRIES CASE 
The 0C  (formulated in a “abridge” form as :0'C The fiscal policy could affect the global 
level of social output via the changes in the “budgetary restriction” of the wealth 
structure optimization induced by its different components) could be directly tested. We 
are proposing such a test for the EU 25 countries case. 
 9
The basic specification of the pooled date model is: 
( )7ittiititit XY εγδβα ++++=  
where itY is the dependent variable, itX is a k  vector of the exogenous variables formed 
by three components of the fiscal pressure determined by the “direct” ,“indirect” and 
“social” fiscal revenues, [ ]itititit AIDX =  and itε  are the errors terms for 
Mi ,..2,1= cross-sectional units observed for dated periods Tt ,...2,1= . The α  
represents the overall constant in the model, while iδ and tγ represent cross-section or 
period specific effects (random or fixed). Identification obviously requires that the β  
coefficients have restrictions placed upon them. 
We may view these data as a set of cross-section specific regressions so that we have 
M cross-sectional equations each with T  observations stacked on top of one another: 
( )8itiTititi IlXlY εγδβα ++++=  
where Tl is a T - element unit vector , TI is the −T element identity matrix ,and γ is a 
vector containing all of the period effects, ( )Tγγγγ ,..., 21= . 
Analogously, we may write the specification as a set of T  period specific equations, each 
with M  observations stacked on top of one another: 
( )9ttMMitiMi llXlY εγδβα ++++=  
where Ml is a M - element unit vector , MI is the −M element identity matrix ,and 
δ is a vector containing all of the period effects, ( )Tδδδδ ,..., 21= . 
More generally, splitting itX  into the three groups (common regressors itX 0 , cross-
section specific regressors itX1 , and period specific regressors itX 2  ), one could obtain: 
( )10221100 ittiititititit XXXY εγδβββα ++++++=  
If there are 1k  common regressors, 2k  cross-section specific regressors, and  3k period 
specific regressors, there are a total of  TkMkkk 3210 ++=  regressors  in β  . 
The spillovers of the fiscal pressure components which are tested could be described as 
follows: 
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• An increase in the component of the fiscal pressure associated with the social transfers 
will increase the relative importance of the public authorities in the social reallocation of 
the resources. Further, it should appear an increase in the demand for the non monetary 
assets. If there are non utilized capacities and this higher level of the demand is perceived 
as a non transitory one, the supply could be adjusted to the new level of the demand by 
quantities; otherwise, there will be an adjustment by prices or alternatively by quantities 
and prices; 
• An increase in the direct taxation component could work as a selector for the 
economic projects with higher yield rate since it affects the volume and the structure of 
the agents’ wealth and the different return rates. If such effects does not appears, the direct 
taxation will leads to a reduction in the real output growth ; 
• An increase in the indirect taxation is reflected in the prices and in the demand for the 
non monetary assets. There could appear a shift in the volume and structure of the demand 
according to the taxation mechanisms as well as redistribution in the social resources. 
Briefly: 
 
Figure 2: The expected influence of the fiscal pressure components  
on real G.D.P. dynamic 
 
Component Expected sign 
A  −+ /  
D  +− /  
I  −+ /  
 
Data are from Eurostat.The time span is from 1995 to 2005 (annually data). The countries 
from the global set and their codification are listed in Table A1 from the Annex. The 
results from a specification of the model with fixed effects (cross and period) for this 
global set are reported in Table A2. The values of  the Durbin-Watson statistics as well 
as the unit roots tests from the Table A3 which tends to indicates that the residual 
variables does not displays “individual” unit roots (with some possible common unit roots 
processes) support an “acceptable” quality of the empirical model. These results are quite 
puzzling: a mix of “correct” signs and statistical significance for the parameters’ 
coefficients among “wrong” signs and low level of statistical significance. In fact, there 
could be identified at least two sub-groups of countries with a distinct impact of fiscal 
policy on economic growth (Table A4, Table A5 and Table A6 and Table A7). For the 
first group (“United Kingdom group”): 
• All the coefficients are statistically significant; 
• With the exception of Denmark and Spain cases, the sign of the coefficients for the 
fiscal pressure linked with  social transfers suggests that this component of fiscal policy is 
negative correlated with the dynamic of output; 
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• With the exception of Denmark, Lithuania and Hungary, the sign of direct taxation 
fiscal pressure indicates that this component is positive correlated with real GDP growth; 
• With the exception of United Kingdom, Poland and Hungary, the sign of indirect 
taxation fiscal pressure shows that this component is positive correlated with real GDP 
growth. 
For the second group (“Germany group”): 
• Only ones coefficients are statistically significant; 
• For the cases of Germany, Italy, Ireland, Finland, Latvia, Czech Republic, Slovakia 
and Slovenia the social transfers influences in a positive manner the GDP dynamic with a 
low statistical significance. For the others members of this group, the influence is negative 
with a higher statistical significance; 
• Without the cases of Greece, Malta and Slovakia there is no evidence of a consistent 
connection between direct taxation and real output. For the cases of Netherlands, Ireland, 
Greece, Austria, Finland, Latvia, Malta and Czech Republic the correlation between these 
two variables is a negative one; for the others, is positive with the same low degree of 
relevance; 
• The correlation between the indirect taxation and the real GDP is positive for all the 
cases in this group but is statistical significant only in the case of France and 
Luxembourg. 
 
Overall, the only consistent finding is that for the EU countries the indirect taxation is 
positively correlated with the rate of change in real GDP (with a reduce number of 
exceptions- United Kingdom, Poland and Hungary); for the social transfers and direct 
taxation there are mix evidences. 
 
4. COMMENTS AND (SELF) CRITICS 
The results from the previous section do not clearly support a rejection of the 0C  neither 
a confirmation of it in a stronger forms that 0'C : the fiscal policy matters for the 
economic growth but the exact nature, the extent of the spillovers, their amplitude and 
persistence are different from country to country for the analyzed period. There could be 
advanced some explanations for such differences: 
• The costs, prices, the volume and structure of the “monetary balances”, the level and 
structure of the income and thesaurization, the returns and risks associated with the non 
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monetary assets are different for the countries in the global set as well as for the two 
component groups; 
• The risk aversion is different not only for different agents but also between countries 
according to their economical background as well as with the non economic factors such 
as the components of the cultural paradigm (“uncertainty avoidance” in HOFSTEDE’s 
terminology); 
• The α  and β  parameters of the anticipation mechanisms are not only agents but also 
country specifics; for instance, if these anticipations concerns the inflation processes the 
“new” members are influenced by their recent high / significant inflation history while the 
“old” ones had benefit from a longer prices stability experience. 
But still there are some important issues to be address for this analytical framework both 
from conceptual and empirical levels: 
A) Theoretical limitations 
1) What is the “hidden hypothesis” in the optimization problem? 
The micro economic foundations of the optimization problem are not clearly stated in its 
formal description. For instance, there is argument why the “monetary balances” are not 
established in a residual manner (and, in fact, there is no role of the thesaurization in the 
model). Worst, there is no argument of the optimization’ systematic character: does really 
the agents trying to choose an “optimal” structure of their wealth? And does they doing 
that in a multi periodic framework? (or, in other words, is there an “dynamic” and “inter 
generational” process of patrimonial adjustment?). Since there are no arguments for 
justifying such a process, it is just a “postulate” and not a “theory”. But the consistence of 
the entire argumentation does critically depend on its viability. 
2) How could individual optimization problems be aggregated? 
Even it could be agree on the optimization micro economic foundations, still there is a 
“aggregation issue” since there are not provided explanations about how the shift to the 
macro level is done from the individual agents specific problems. 
3) How “bounded” is the proposed anticipation mechanism? 
The 1C (and, in a certain degree 0C  ) could be directly derived only if anticipation 
mechanism stands as a “real” descriptor of the way in which the agents forms their 
anticipations. On could notice that: a) it is an “empirical” anticipation model since in fact 
argues that all the available information is used but the relative weights of the current and 
past information could not be ex ante established; b) it is a particular definition of the 
bounded rationality and does not formally reflects the costs of obtaining and using the 
information. 
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4) What about the financial infrastructure? 
The transmission mechanisms of the fiscal policy spillovers are linked with returns and 
risk but there is nothing specific to their formation and to the role of financial 
infrastructure institutional and functional degree of maturity. Also there is nothing about 
the composition of the monetary and quasi monetary assets (in terms of complexity, 
liquidity / marketability and financial performances). 
5)    Where is the Union? 
The empirical analysis is applied over the EU case. But there is nothing particular about 
the inter-countries linkages and about the harmonization of the national fiscal policies 
inside the Union mechanisms. 
B) Empirical estimation problems 
Not only the theoretical but also the empirical part of the paper is affected by imperfect 
clarifications. Some of them are connected with: 
° The stability of the regression models and the quality of the results (for instance, in 
terms of properties of the residuals variables); 
° The identification problems for the involved parameters; 
° The possible existence of non-linear interactions between the variables and the effects 
of such interactions; 
° The insufficient number of observation and the absence of an explanation for the 
composition of the samples for the global set as well as for the two groups; 
° The instability of the coefficients signs not only between groups but also inside the 
same group etc. 
Despite all these caveats, we argue that the proposed model could explain (with certain 
supplementary clarifications) the spillovers of the fiscal policy over the economic growth 
based on micro economic foundations and could supply even in mix terms some empirical 
support for the EU 25 countries. The main output consists in the thesis of the non 
uniformity of these spillovers and in the idea that there should be provided a consistent 
explanatory framework for the transmission over micro channels of the effects induced by 
the changes in the different components of fiscal pressure.  
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Table A1: The global set of countries 
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Code Country 
1 Belgium 
2 France 
3 Germany 
4 Italy 
5 Luxembourg 
6 Netherlands 
7 Denmark 
8 Ireland 
9 United Kingdom 
10 Greece 
11 Portugal 
12 Spain 
13 Austria 
14 Finland 
15 Sweden 
16 Cyprus 
17 Estonia 
18 Latvia 
19 Lithuania 
20 Malta 
21 Poland 
22 Czech Republic 
23 Slovakia 
24 Slovenia 
25 Hungary 
The “A” set 
Code Country 
7 Denmark 
9 United Kingdom 
12 Spain 
17 Estonia 
19 Lithuania 
21 Poland 
25 Hungary 
The “B” set 
Code Country 
1 Belgium 
2 France 
3 Germany 
4 Italy 
5 Luxembourg 
6 Netherlands 
8 Ireland 
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10 Greece 
11 Portugal 
13 Austria 
14 Finland 
15 Sweden 
16 Cyprus 
18 Latvia 
20 Malta 
22 Czech Republic 
23 Slovakia 
24 Slovenia 
 
 
Table A2: The parameters of the empirical model for the global set  
 
Dependent Variable: Real GDP growth rate   
Method: Pooled Least Squares   
Sample: 1995 2005   
Included observations: 11   
Cross-sections included: 25   
Total pool (balanced) observations: 275  
Cross-section weights (PCSE) standard errors & covariance (d.f. 
        corrected)   
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     C 19.31412 4.472689 4.318234 0.0000 
1--A1 -0.290920 0.064190 -4.532169 0.0000 
2--A2 -0.466808 0.365972 -1.275529 0.2039 
3--A3 0.000123 0.040374 0.003042 0.9976 
4--A4 0.166417 0.115857 1.436399 0.1528 
5--A5 -0.915514 1.013351 -0.903453 0.3676 
6--A6 0.058320 0.173664 0.335822 0.7374 
7--A7 1.425258 0.354357 4.022098 0.0001 
8--A8 -0.514474 0.278828 -1.845130 0.0668 
9--A9 -0.205052 0.041106 -4.988316 0.0000 
10--A10 -0.065916 0.039305 -1.677037 0.0954 
11--A11 -0.285067 0.062730 -4.544340 0.0000 
12--A12 0.270865 0.112618 2.405173 0.0173 
13--A13 -0.678805 0.436592 -1.554781 0.1219 
14--A14 0.661114 0.213669 3.094096 0.0023 
15--A15 -0.258789 0.054907 -4.713181 0.0000 
 17
16--A16 -0.017117 0.030529 -0.560682 0.5758 
17--A17 -0.196269 0.052327 -3.750807 0.0002 
18--A18 0.423342 0.169500 2.497595 0.0135 
19--A19 -0.818755 0.174492 -4.692226 0.0000 
20--A20 -0.175772 0.192334 -0.913890 0.3621 
21--A21 -0.258676 0.086261 -2.998761 0.0031 
22--A22 0.065960 0.126295 0.522274 0.6022 
23--A23 0.034556 0.059791 0.577941 0.5641 
24--A24 0.094864 0.067723 1.400766 0.1632 
25--A25 -0.085445 0.030809 -2.773430 0.0062 
1--D1 0.503996 0.296182 1.701645 0.0907 
2--D2 0.589196 0.662318 0.889598 0.3750 
3--D3 0.330454 0.215394 1.534184 0.1269 
4--D4 0.143993 0.193705 0.743365 0.4583 
5--D5 -0.019761 2.846261 -0.006943 0.9945 
6--D6 -0.653490 1.140429 -0.573021 0.5674 
7--D7 -0.654384 0.235154 -2.782793 0.0060 
8--D8 -0.323195 1.664732 -0.194143 0.8463 
9--D9 0.414919 0.159164 2.606867 0.0100 
10--D10 -0.278274 0.105436 -2.639275 0.0091 
11--D11 0.302831 0.400017 0.757046 0.4501 
12--D12 0.699088 0.504471 1.385785 0.1677 
13--D13 -0.611386 0.480260 -1.273030 0.2048 
14--D14 -0.048744 0.203000 -0.240118 0.8105 
15--D15 0.082132 0.140863 0.583063 0.5606 
16--D16 -0.082073 0.102596 -0.799969 0.4249 
17--D17 0.176005 0.122904 1.432059 0.1540 
18--D18 -0.081991 0.125168 -0.655050 0.5133 
19--D19 -0.194836 0.113169 -1.721628 0.0870 
20--D20 -0.968718 0.098741 -9.810743 0.0000 
21--D21 0.251075 0.059769 4.200751 0.0000 
22--D22 -0.101662 0.624623 -0.162758 0.8709 
23--D23 0.588567 0.137342 4.285404 0.0000 
24--D24 0.139719 0.447206 0.312426 0.7551 
25--D25 -1.019116 0.214060 -4.760891 0.0000 
1--I1 0.455950 0.387112 1.177824 0.2406 
2--I2 -0.029364 2.269476 -0.012939 0.9897 
3--I3 -0.559765 0.564034 -0.992431 0.3224 
4--I4 -0.107059 0.100482 -1.065455 0.2882 
5--I5 5.177718 4.340038 1.193012 0.2346 
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6--I6 -2.625614 1.233842 -2.127999 0.0348 
7--I7 0.807670 0.207642 3.889715 0.0001 
8--I8 -2.003729 1.332217 -1.504056 0.1345 
9--I9 -0.799730 0.562132 -1.422672 0.1567 
10--I10 0.344258 0.569269 0.604736 0.5462 
11--I11 -0.397354 0.311425 -1.275923 0.2038 
12--I12 0.044542 0.198872 0.223973 0.8231 
13--I13 -0.484527 0.649223 -0.746318 0.4565 
14--I14 0.393867 0.595917 0.660943 0.5096 
15--I15 -0.792121 0.333417 -2.375768 0.0187 
16--I16 -0.169931 0.110857 -1.532884 0.1272 
17--I17 0.049202 0.029633 1.660393 0.0987 
18--I18 0.637295 0.145535 4.378983 0.0000 
19--I19 0.509813 0.095701 5.327149 0.0000 
20--I20 -0.079764 0.115274 -0.691947 0.4899 
21--I21 -0.249148 0.059517 -4.186185 0.0000 
22--I22 -0.425584 0.213678 -1.991706 0.0481 
23--I23 -0.195288 0.177410 -1.100770 0.2726 
24--I24 0.234354 0.138614 1.690695 0.0928 
25--I25 -0.362899 0.160175 -2.265636 0.0248 
Fixed Effects (Cross)     
1--C -1.365390    
2--C 6.413506    
3--C 10.19378    
4--C 1.327334    
5--C -34.79650    
6--C 46.03477    
7--C 14.43451    
8--C 42.18809    
9--C 15.46776    
10--C -9.877915    
11--C -3.467476    
12--C -16.02573    
13--C 29.38778    
14--C -11.15386    
15--C 21.80504    
16--C -3.508284    
17--C -15.43250    
18--C -28.58480    
19--C -13.61433    
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20--C 1.115535    
21--C -11.72393    
22--C -7.251486    
23--C -18.53342    
24--C -15.06082    
25--C 2.028330    
Fixed Effects (Period)     
1995--C -2.164083    
1996--C -1.899932    
1997--C -1.391865    
1998--C -0.761164    
1999--C -0.092611    
2000--C 0.375373    
2001--C 0.806749    
2002--C 1.108069    
2003--C 1.071562    
2004--C 1.074510    
2005--C 1.873391    
     
     
 Effects Specification   
     
     Cross-section fixed (dummy variables)  
Period fixed (dummy variables)  
     
     R-squared 0.996460 Mean dependent var 16.90909 
Adjusted R-squared 0.994122 S.D. dependent var 11.19914 
S.E. of regression 0.858625 Akaike info criterion 2.822204 
Sum squared resid 121.6440 Schwarz criterion 4.268913 
Log likelihood -278.0531 F-statistic 426.1349 
Durbin-Watson stat 1.720565 Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000 
     
     
 
 
Table A3: The unit root tests for the residual of the global set model 
 
Exogenous variables: Individual effects 
User specified lags at: 1   
Andrews bandwidth selection using Quadratic Spectral kernel 
Balanced observations for each test   
     
     
   Cross-  
 20
Method Statistic Prob.** sections Obs 
Null: Unit root (assumes common unit root process)  
Levin, Lin & Chu t* -3.81069  0.0001  25  225 
Breitung t-stat -3.31936  0.0005  25  200 
     
Null: Unit root (assumes individual unit root process)  
Im, Pesaran and Shin W-stat  -4.60736  0.0000  25  225 
ADF - Fisher Chi-square  108.767  0.0000  25  225 
PP - Fisher Chi-square  219.385  0.0000  25  225 
     
Null: No unit root (assumes common unit root process)  
Hadri Z-stat  12.8342  0.0000  25  225 
     
     
** Probabilities for Fisher tests are computed using an asympotic Chi 
        -square distribution. All other tests assume asymptotic normality. 
 
Table A4: The parameters of the empirical model for Group “A” 
 
Dependent Variable: Real GDP growth rate   
Method: Pooled Least Squares   
Sample: 1995 2005   
Included observations: 11   
Cross-sections included: 7   
Total pool (balanced) observations: 77  
Cross-section weights (PCSE) standard errors & covariance (d.f. 
        corrected)   
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     C 13.17047 0.507454 25.95400 0.0000 
7--A7 2.000393 0.074186 26.96461 0.0000 
9--A9 -0.166998 0.015608 -10.69952 0.0000 
12--A12 0.158150 0.038716 4.084831 0.0002 
17--A17 -0.091520 0.008770 -10.43553 0.0000 
19--A19 -0.555632 0.036489 -15.22748 0.0000 
21--A21 -0.119664 0.017324 -6.907283 0.0000 
25--A25 -0.136031 0.007428 -18.31423 0.0000 
7--D7 -0.787382 0.045657 -17.24566 0.0000 
9--D9 0.659166 0.055990 11.77291 0.0000 
12--D12 0.809266 0.184926 4.376157 0.0001 
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17--D17 0.198258 0.022241 8.914008 0.0000 
19--D19 -0.157412 0.027034 -5.822795 0.0000 
21--D21 0.235859 0.011861 19.88605 0.0000 
25--D25 -0.767880 0.045848 -16.74823 0.0000 
7--I7 1.169577 0.044849 26.07789 0.0000 
9--I9 -0.985633 0.183640 -5.367196 0.0000 
12--I12 0.260353 0.073434 3.545394 0.0010 
17--I17 0.018217 0.006260 2.910023 0.0059 
19--I19 0.503992 0.022008 22.90046 0.0000 
21--I21 -0.282227 0.012910 -21.86127 0.0000 
25--I25 -0.134342 0.030553 -4.397057 0.0001 
Fixed Effects (Cross)     
7--C 17.45633    
9--C 19.77662    
12--C -13.19332    
17--C -10.06618    
19--C -10.16327    
21--C -6.216779    
25--C 2.406603    
Fixed Effects 
(Period)     
1995--C -1.982924    
1996--C -1.607894    
1997--C -1.250611    
1998--C -0.995663    
1999--C -0.360601    
2000--C 0.140312    
2001--C 0.556738    
2002--C 0.952393    
2003--C 1.137988    
2004--C 1.607722    
2005--C 1.802539    
     
     
 Effects Specification   
     
     Cross-section fixed (dummy variables)  
Period fixed (dummy variables)  
     
     R-squared 0.999627     Mean dependent var 12.59351 
Adjusted R-squared 0.999272     S.D. dependent var 10.97215 
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S.E. of regression 0.295995     Akaike info criterion 0.709818 
Sum squared resid 3.416899     Schwarz criterion 1.866501 
Log likelihood 10.67200     F-statistic 2821.404 
Durbin-Watson stat 2.248014     Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000 
     
     
 
 
 
 
Table A5: The unit root tests for the residual of the Group “A” 
 
Exogenous variables: Individual effects 
User specified lags at: 1   
Andrews bandwidth selection using Quadratic Spectral kernel 
Balanced observations for each test   
     
     
   Cross-  
Method Statistic Prob.** sections Obs 
Null: Unit root (assumes common unit root process)  
Levin, Lin & Chu t* -0.90752  0.1821  7  63 
Breitung t-stat -2.96977  0.0015  7  56 
     
Null: Unit root (assumes individual unit root process)  
Im, Pesaran and Shin W-stat  -2.68562  0.0036  7  63 
ADF - Fisher Chi-square  32.1666  0.0038  7  63 
PP - Fisher Chi-square  86.6762  0.0000  7  63 
     
Null: No unit root (assumes common unit root process)  
Hadri Z-stat  4.76121  0.0000  7  63 
 
    
     
** Probabilities for Fisher tests are computed using an asympotic Chi 
        -square distribution. All other tests assume asymptotic normality. 
 
 
Table A6: The parameters of the empirical model for Group “B” 
 
Dependent Variable: Real GDP growth rate   
Method: Pooled Least Squares   
Sample: 1995 2005   
Included observations: 11   
Cross-sections included: 18   
 23
Total pool (balanced) observations: 198  
Cross-section weights (PCSE) standard errors & covariance (d.f. 
        corrected)   
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     C 21.62617 6.103251 3.543386 0.0006 
1--A1 -0.373997 0.103052 -3.629217 0.0004 
2--A2 -0.426859 0.352863 -1.209703 0.2289 
3--A3 0.031821 0.055297 0.575462 0.5661 
4--A4 0.051192 0.172885 0.296103 0.7677 
5--A5 -1.017857 0.998038 -1.019858 0.3099 
6--A6 0.062436 0.171845 0.363330 0.7170 
8--A8 -0.548777 0.262362 -2.091680 0.0386 
10--A10 -0.096715 0.052647 -1.837068 0.0688 
11--A11 -0.267361 0.072934 -3.665785 0.0004 
13--A13 -0.551072 0.461432 -1.194266 0.2348 
14--A14 0.684834 0.262338 2.610498 0.0102 
15--A15 -0.290277 0.061666 -4.707209 0.0000 
16--A16 -0.050643 0.049925 -1.014380 0.3125 
18--A18 0.322579 0.238235 1.354038 0.1784 
20--A20 -0.188185 0.250819 -0.750282 0.4546 
22--A22 0.106435 0.128995 0.825115 0.4110 
23--A23 0.080637 0.089964 0.896319 0.3719 
24--A24 0.137165 0.096717 1.418210 0.1588 
1--D1 0.433931 0.376186 1.153501 0.2511 
2--D2 0.493700 0.641325 0.769813 0.4430 
3--D3 0.336000 0.306597 1.095900 0.2754 
4--D4 0.181055 0.249355 0.726094 0.4692 
5--D5 0.146411 2.797076 0.052344 0.9583 
6--D6 -0.895095 1.148158 -0.779592 0.4372 
8--D8 -0.295070 1.562444 -0.188852 0.8505 
10--D10 -0.326304 0.132479 -2.463068 0.0152 
11--D11 0.164461 0.459870 0.357626 0.7213 
13--D13 -0.663629 0.500524 -1.325867 0.1875 
14--D14 -0.137560 0.255250 -0.538921 0.5910 
15--D15 0.058458 0.153795 0.380101 0.7046 
16--D16 -0.140723 0.128459 -1.095466 0.2756 
18--D18 -0.137932 0.156262 -0.882697 0.3792 
20--D20 -0.921009 0.135798 -6.782198 0.0000 
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22--D22 -0.038230 0.631924 -0.060497 0.9519 
23--D23 0.610419 0.179827 3.394485 0.0009 
24--D24 0.414529 0.624499 0.663778 0.5081 
1--I1 0.416372 0.533962 0.779779 0.4371 
2--I2 -0.063680 2.183862 -0.029159 0.9768 
3--I3 -0.914419 0.799778 -1.143342 0.2553 
4--I4 -0.187415 0.139225 -1.346134 0.1809 
5--I5 5.256458 4.261968 1.233340 0.2199 
6--I6 -2.834559 1.238019 -2.289592 0.0239 
8--I8 -1.962270 1.255030 -1.563524 0.1207 
10--I10 0.358814 0.728790 0.492342 0.6234 
11--I11 -0.491447 0.333149 -1.475158 0.1429 
13--I13 -0.565448 0.670616 -0.843177 0.4009 
14--I14 0.296650 0.714530 0.415169 0.6788 
15--I15 -0.751328 0.355705 -2.112221 0.0368 
16--I16 -0.170192 0.147742 -1.151948 0.2517 
18--I18 0.716347 0.200730 3.568705 0.0005 
20--I20 -0.085420 0.148457 -0.575382 0.5661 
22--I22 -0.429240 0.214956 -1.996875 0.0482 
23--I23 -0.201691 0.235642 -0.855922 0.3938 
24--I24 0.290957 0.196327 1.482001 0.1411 
Fixed Effects (Cross)     
1--C -0.493502    
2--C 5.230562    
3--C 11.78574    
4--C 1.310655    
5--C -39.32590    
6--C 49.31416    
8--C 39.31910    
10--C -11.52751    
11--C -3.224405    
13--C 27.30252    
14--C -10.60073    
15--C 19.93648    
16--C -4.576914    
18--C -30.25035    
20--C -1.494860    
22--C -10.52065    
23--C -21.45264    
24--C -20.73176    
 25
Fixed Effects (Period)     
1995--C -2.200067    
1996--C -1.951394    
1997--C -1.385003    
1998--C -0.642810    
1999--C 0.058845    
2000--C 0.525187    
2001--C 0.951564    
2002--C 1.178059    
2003--C 0.960652    
2004--C 0.781964    
2005--C 1.723004    
     
     
 Effects Specification   
     
     Cross-section fixed (dummy variables)  
Period fixed (dummy variables)  
     
     R-squared 0.995042     Mean dependent var 18.58737 
Adjusted R-squared 0.991580     S.D. dependent var 10.85765 
S.E. of regression 0.996326     Akaike info criterion 3.124122 
Sum squared resid 115.1492     Schwarz criterion 4.485929 
Log likelihood -227.2880     F-statistic 287.4031 
Durbin-Watson stat 1.694942     Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000 
     
     
 
Table A7: The unit root tests for the residual of the Group “B” 
 
Exogenous variables: Individual effects 
User specified lags at: 1   
Andrews bandwidth selection using Quadratic Spectral kernel 
Balanced observations for each test   
     
     
   Cross-  
Method Statistic Prob.** sections Obs 
Null: Unit root (assumes common unit root process)  
Levin, Lin & Chu t* -1.14925  0.1252  18  162 
Breitung t-stat -3.14382  0.0008  18  144 
     
Null: Unit root (assumes individual unit root process)  
 26
Im, Pesaran and Shin W-stat  -2.68087  0.0037  18  162 
ADF - Fisher Chi-square  62.7027  0.0038  18  162 
PP - Fisher Chi-square  138.018  0.0000  18  162 
     
Null: No unit root (assumes common unit root process)  
Hadri Z-stat  11.0732  0.0000  18  162 
     
     
** Probabilities for Fisher tests are computed using an asympotic Chi 
        -square distribution. All other tests assume asymptotic normality. 
 
 
 
